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Leonard v.B. Sutton Award Paper
The Kurds' Right to Secede Under
International Law: Self-Determination
Prevails Over Political Manipulation
GREGORY J. EWALD*
We are a people who faced genocide and managed to survive'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is unsettling to witness the rapid proliferation of secessionist
movements around the world! absent any criteria, procedure, or insti-
tution capable of determining legitimate claims and monitoring the
process. In fact, Western political philosophy noticeably lacks a theory
of secession.8 Establishing criteria by which to judge secessionist
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1. Statement by Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, quoted in, John Darnton,
Salahaddin Journal; A Son's Promise: That Kurds' Dream Doesn't Die, Jan. 28, 1994,
N.Y. TIMES, at A4.
2. See generally Arnold Beichman, An Immunity that Sets U.S. Apart, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at G4. Cries for separatism, secession, and independence are
heard around the world. Furthermore, ethnic minorities seek independence. It would
seem that only a few countries are currently not involved in a secessionist struggle,
namely the U.S. and Japan. Id. Many of these conflicts result from a heightened
sense of ethnic awareness, or even a feeling of tribalism. Robin Wright, The New
Tribalism: Defending Human Rights in an Age of Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Strife Owes
More to Present than to History, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at 1.
3. ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION - THE MoRALrry OF POLITICAL DIvoEcE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 1 (1991); Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theo-
ry of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322, 323 n.1 (1991) (stating that major political philoso-
phers like Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Mill failed to
address the issue of secession in a meaningful manner). Secession has been justified
on the theoretical basis that governments rule by consent of the people, which can
be withdrawn at any time. See RIO SUREDA, THE EVOLUIriON OF THE RIGHT OF
DENY. J. INTL L. & PoLY
claims has become a pragmatic necessity, in addition to being theoreti-
cally challenging.4 The United Nations (U.N.) is the logical institution
to bear the burden of regulating secessionist claims, but it must be
willing to include secession as a legitimate possibility under self-deter-
mination without limiting its application to narrowly defined colonial
situations.5 Furthermore, the trend towards making individual human
rights, rather than traditional state rights, the basis for international
law must continue, reducing the opportunity for a state to use seces-
sion as a political tool to further its own self-interest!
The issue of secession requires consideration of a number of seem-
ingly incompatible international law principles. Territorial integrity,
non-intervention and the prohibition against the use of force must be
reconciled with the broad principle of self-determination.' Additional-
SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules
for a New Era, 14 HOUS. J. INL L 521, 547-54 (1992) (discussing criteria for seces-
sion). See generally Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and Interna-
tional Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 299 (1993) (summarizing various theoretical positions on secession).
But see Michael Eisner, A Procedural Model for the Resolution of Secessionist Dis-
putes, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 407, 418-19 (1992) (arguing that establishing a procedure
to resolve secessionist disputes is more important than formulating criteria because
criteria fail to keep pace with changes in international law and politics).
5. Many people have criticized the U.N. for either failing to involve itself in
secessionist struggles, or for limiting the legitimacy of secessionist claims to colonial
situations. See, eg., MICHIA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
1-76 (1982) (criticizing the U.N. for creating a double standard that limits secession
to colonial situations where the dominant country is a Western power); Ved P.
Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INTL Y. 257, 278 (1981) (recognizing the necessity for existing
institutional structures within the U.N. to regulate secessionist claims, thereby add-
ing predictability and avoiding violence). The international community must demon-
strate a willingness to involve itself in secessionist struggles in order to resolve the
dispute peacefully. Frankel, supra note 4, at 543-48.
6. Nations have typically used principles of international law, such as territorial
integrity, to justify harsh treatment of secessionist movements within their borders.
These same nations, however, have relied on other international law principles, i.e.
self-determination, to justify aiding a secessionist group in another country. See LEE
C. BucHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DrERMINATION 141-53 (1978)
(after Belgium lost its colony of the Congo, it supported a secessionist movement in
the Katanga region of the same country); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and
Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INTL LAW 321 (1972) (after failing to keep Paki-
stan a part of India, India supported the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan).
7. E.g., POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 73; Debra A. Valentine, Note, The Logic
of Secession, 89 YALE L. J. 802, 809 (1980); but see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and
Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INTL L. 177, 178 (1991)
(arguing that difficult normative issues arising out of secessionist claims are not
incompatible with territorial integrity). In fact, the tension between territorial integ-
rity and self-determination has severely hindered the international community's will-
ingness and ability to intervene into secessionist struggles. Eisner, supra note 4, at
408. Interestingly, this tension may be broken if Canada were to allow Quebec to se-
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ly, extending self-determination to include secession under certain sit-
uations must be consistent with the modern trend in international law
of emphasizing human rights.8
-This article briefly traces the development of self-determination
and its relationship to secession. Next, it highlights several instances
when states manipulated self-determination by using secession as a
political tool to further their own self-interests. The article then ad-
dresses the difficult, but necessary, task of defining criteria and stan-
dards by which to evaluate secessionist claims. These criteria are then
applied to the Kurds, concluding that they should be allowed to secede
given, inter alia, the gross violation of human rights that has taken
place in Turkey and Iraq. Finally, the article concludes with the rec-
ommendation that the international community should recognize seces-
sion as a legitimate right under certain circumstances and empower
the U.N. to regulate secessionist claims by applying consistent criteria,
thus promoting stability and reducing violence in the international
community.
H. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DETERWNATION
President Woodrow Wilson first articulated the idea of self-deter-
mination at the beginning of the twentieth century. "'Self-
determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.' The
Wilsonian principle of self-determination arose out of the notion that
all people had the right to self-government, including the freedom to
select leaders and to consent to be governed.0 Wilson's idealism, a
positive step towards furthering human rights under international law,
cede without opposition, thereby accepting self-determination as an overriding prin-
ciple to territorial integrity. Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right
of Secession under Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INTL L. 583 (1992).
8. See UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DET'MIUNATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
191 (1972) (recognizing a shift in emphasis away from state rights and toward a
greater respect for individuals). Self-determination developed as an aspect of human
rights belonging to a group, rather than an individual. Id& at 271. "International
prescriptions based on authoritative human rights policies are penetrating the cloak
of State sovereignty and are increasingly being implemented and enforced by world
organizations." Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Communi-
ty Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INVL L. 779, 833 (1976).
9. WOODROW WILSON, REPLY OF PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON TO THE ADDRESS-
ES OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELOR, AND THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AusTRo-
HUNGARIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1918), reprinted in OFFICIAL STATE-
MENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS, DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918,
265, 268 (James B. Scott ed. 1921). See generally Deborah Z. Case, Re-Thinking Self-
Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRA-
CUSE J. IN7TL L & COM. 21 (1992) (providing a history of self-determination and
criticizing the traditional application of self-determination as merely theoretical,
thereby failing to regulate the conduct of states in practice).
10. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
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did not address the pragmatic difficulty of defining who constitutes a
group capable of exercising self-determination,"
The League of Nations recognized self-determination but strictly
circumscribed its application, making the territorial integrity and
political independence of existing sovereign units the primary norm.'
In the Aaland Islands case, a committee of jurists appointed by the
Council of the League to investigate a claim by islanders under Finn-
ish jurisdiction who wanted to join Sweden under the new principle of
self-determination held that positive international law does not recog-
nize the right of a group to separate themselves from a state.' The
committee's decision had a direct bearing on the early development of
self-determination by holding that self-determination had not yet be-
come positive international law and no attempt should be made to
legitimatize secession. 4
The U.N. Charter expressly incorporated self-determination into
Article 1(2) and Article 55.' Although self-determination was initially
considered an international legal principle rather than a right or bind-
ing law,'6 the U.N. General Assembly passed several highly influen-
tial resolutions promoting the principle. 7 This reinforced the belief
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id at 8.
13. LEAGUE Op NATIONS O4., Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920). See also UMozuR=nE,
supra note 8, at 180 (quoting from the Aaland Islands case).
14. UMOzURIKM, supra note 8, at 181. "The grant or refusal of the right to a
section of the population to decide the sovereignty over a piece of territory by plebi-
scite or other means, the committee held, was an act of sovereignty and a matter
within that state's internal jurisdiction." Id.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 2. The purposes of the U.N. are to "develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen uni-
versal peace." Id. 'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ...
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
16. See BUCHHErT, supra note 3, at 76 (recognizing the debate as to whether
self-determination is a legal right or merely a political principle); POMERANCE, supra
note 5, at 9.
17. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes the will of the people the
basis of government authority. GA. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, at 71, 75, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Res. 217]. The U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples reafrms fundamental human rights
based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples and the
desire to end colonialism in all its manifestations. GA. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Seas., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Res. 1514]. A second
resolution passed in the same year states that self-government could be obtained by
any of three means, including independence, association or integration. G.A. Res.
1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16., at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [herein-
after Res. 1541]. The U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nationy declares that subjugating peoples to alien domination is an ob-
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that self-determination had evolved into a right under customary in-
ternational law18 that is binding on all nations regardless of their con-
sent-." Furthermore, states are bound by the U.N. Charter to respect
the principle of self-determination.' The definition of self-determina-
tion has evolved from "a personal freedom to make decisions... [into
a] broader right to realize one's full potentialities as a human be-
ing." The principle also has become increasingly accepted in state
practice and has appeared frequently in international treaties, U.N.
documents, and International Court of Justice opinions.'m Although
self-determination has attained the status of customary international
law, some disagreement remains as to what, if any, limitations might
apply. Acceptance has not necessarily brought agreement on the scope
and content of self-determination.'
An active debate currently exists as to whether self-determination
has become a preemptory norm (jus cogens)." The strongest argument
stacle to international peace and the principle of self-determination of peoples is a
significant contribution to international law. GA. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25 Sess.,
Supp. No. 28 at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Res. 2625]. The U.N.
Declaration on the Right to Development declares that the right to development im-
plies the right of peoples to self-determination. GA Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986).
18. Self-determination meets the objective test (extent and uniformity of applica-
tion) and the subjective test (opinio juria), both of which are required for a principle
to become customary international law. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.
& Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 44 (Feb. 20); UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 189. Self-de-
termination has an extremely long history, creating a pedigree with a unique claim
to legitimacy. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (arguing that self-determination provides a solid basis on
which to build other rights including free expression and participation in an electoral
process).
19. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 196.
20. Id.
21. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 834, quoting in part W. WAGAR, BUILDING THE CITY
OF MAN 94-96 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (recognizing
the right of self-determination and holding that its application outweighs any past
legal and historical ties between the people of the Western Sahara and Morocco or
Mauritania) [hereinafter Western Sahara Case]; Advisory Opinion on Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16
[hereinafter Namibia Case].
23. This is no different, however, than other international law principles like
non-intervention and self-defense. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DE-
TERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150, 178 (1977); Nanda, supra note 5, at 259
(stating that self-determination in the specific context of colonialism has reached the
status of customary international law, but the content and scope of any further
application is without consensus). Self-determination has developed, in theory, a
broad normative role under international law but due to its ambiguity, self-determi-
nation has proven difficult to implement in practice. Eisner, supra note 4, at 410.
24. The hyperbole used by both proponents and opponents of self-determination
as jus cogen. tends to be little more than conclusory. Gross Espiell claims that "to-
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against self-determination as jus cogens is the fact that it is not uni-
versally applicable in practice. The relative importance of self-determi-
nation compared to other normative principles, namely territorial in-
tegrity and nonintervention, is also debated, but the emerging majority
opinion is that self-determination should outweigh inconsistent
norms.' However, several of the same U.N. documents recognizing
self-determination also limit its application when it conflicts with other
principles." Therefore, although self-determination has reached the
status of customary international law, it probably fails to meet the re-
quirements ofjus cogens.
The primary theoretical foundation for justifying secession has
been that (1) the consent of the people to be governed can be with-
drawn; and (2) no self-determination actually occurred in colonial situ-
ations.' The U.N. and state practice first extended the right of self-
determination to a right of secession in a colonial context.u Any legit-
imization of secession is somewhat remarkable given the strong histor-
ic bias against expanding the scope of self-determination. Former Sec-
day no one can challenge the fact that . .. the principle of self-determination neces-
sarily possesses the character of jus cogens8. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 70. Oppo-
nents claim that to suggest self-determination is a principle of jus cogens is without
any firm legal foundation because granting it to one group means denying it to
another. Id. at 71.
25. 'The denial of fundamental human rights for the sake of preserving the
territorial integrity of a body politic is incompatible with the newly emerging princi-
ple of jus cogens." Suzuki, supra note 6, at 841. 'If the principle of territorial integ-
rity [sic] is clearly incompatible with that of self-determination, the former must,
under present international law, give way to the latter." UMOZURIKE, supra note 8,
at 187. But see BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 38 (stating that one response has been
to establish a hierarchy of the norms of nonintervention, prohibition against the use
of force, and self-determination, giving preference to the former two principles); R. J.
VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 236 (1974) (arguing that the
U.N. Charter was made with the primary concern of building order between states,
thus emphasizing the established norm of nonintervention).
26. "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with -the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter of the United Nations." Res. 1514, supra note 17. "Recalling the
duty of States to refrain in their interjnational relations from military, political, eco-
nomic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any State." Res. 2625, supra note 17.
27. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 221 (when the tyranny is universal a revolu-
tion is justified, but when it is discriminatory secession is justified); SUREDA, supra
note 3, at 17.
28. Self-determination appears in U.N. documents in order to overcome colonial-
ism, not to legitimize secession. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 84. However, the num-
ber of non-colonial claims to self-determination is likely to increase in number and
intensity and it would be unwise for the international community to reject these
claims as it has in the past. Nanda, supra note 6, at 322. In practice, international
law evaluated the legitimacy of independence struggles by applying the norm of
decolonization, which mandates that self-determination outweighs territorial integrity.
In a non-colonial context, however, territorial integrity historically outweighed self-de-
termination. Eisner, supra note 4, at 412.
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retary of the U.N., General U Thant, unequivocally stated that the
U.N. "has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will
ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State.""
By including independence as one of the three methods by which self-
government may be obtained, however, the U.N. at least implicitly
legitimatized secession under certain circumstances.' Furthermore,
U.N. Resolution 2625 can be interpreted as authorizing secession if a
group (people) can show they are governed by a non-representative
government or are subject to unequal treatment.81 Virtually everyone
agrees that secession is not a universal right.' The debate arises in
attempting to define when secession should be allowed. For example,
international law does not give minorities dispersed throughout a
country the right to secede.' At the other end of the spectrum, no
rule of international law condemns secession under all circumstanc-
es.4
The reluctance of states to fully accept a right of secession has
slowed the trend towards a limited acceptance of the legitimacy of
secession in international law.' It is understandable that states are
reluctant to recognize a right of secession that could be used to justify
29. 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 36 (Feb. 1970) (qugte taken from Nanda, supra
note 5, at 263). See also HURST HANNUm, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DE-
TERMINATION: THE AcCOMMODATION OF CONFICTINo RIGHT 49 (1990).
30. Res. 1541, supra note 17 (including independence, association, or integration).
31. Res. 2625, supra note 17. See also Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis
in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and
Croatia's Right to Secede, 1992 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (1992).
32. To apply secession as a truly universal right would extend it to each individ-
ual, legitimatizing the frequently cited fear that a right of secession would lead to
anarchy. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 337-39. But see Robert W. McGee & Danny
Kin-Kong Lam, Hong Kong's Option to Secede, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 431-32
(1992) (arguing an absolutist position that individuals have the right to form the
government of their choice regardless of their motives or timing).
33. Res. 1514 & Res. 1541, supra note 17 (limiting the right of self-determina-
tion to 'peoples,' which is interpreted as the people of a whole territory). PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 18 (1990). Cri-
teria for secession are discussed infra, at section WV of this article.
34. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 199. The various justifications for opposing
secession are neither singularly nor cumulatively sufficient to deny secession under
all circumstances. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 332. But see Iglar, supra note 31, at
239 (concluding that Slovenia and Croatia have a right to self-determination under
international law, but they do not have a right to secede because secession is not
recognized under international law).
35. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 96-97 ('Thus, an historical survey ... of the
status of secessionist self-determination within the confines of positive international
law confirms the evolution of a limited acceptance of its legitimacy.*). Although his-
torically secession found only limited legal authority, recent state practice in the
Baltic states and Yugoslavia, to name only a few examples, demonstrates an emerg-
ing acceptance of secession under international law. See generally Eastwood, supra
note 4, at 299. If Canada were to allow Quebec to secede, state practice would fur-
ther support an emerging right of secession. Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at
583.
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secessionist claims by groups within their own borders." However,
several peaceful secessions" and the incorporation of a right to secede
into several constitutions' demonstrate that states have accepted se-
cession to some degree. World-wide decolonization' and recognition of
independent nations that seceded from the former Soviet Union' are
further evidence that states have recognized the legitimacy of some
secessionist claims through state practice. The reluctance, or willing-
ness, of a state to recognize a right of secession, however, derives from
the self-interest of that state.
III. STATE MANIPULATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
States have traditionally used self-determination, and its most
extreme manifestation of secession, to justify actions in furtherance of
their own self-interest, while often denying it to other states,4' at-
tempting to legitimatize political actions using international law. In
the Vietnam conflict, for example, "all sides claimed to be struggling in
support of the right of 'self-determination."' This manipulation of
international law to justify politically self-serving use of force has a
destabilizing effect on the world community. Clearly, what is one
group's war of national liberation is also another group's war of nation-
al disintegration."
Historically, both the United States and the Soviet Union have
manipulated the principle of self-determination to achieve a political
36. Id.
37. For example, the government of Senegal peacefully seceded from the Mali
Federation in 1960 and Singapore seceded from the Malaysian Federation in August
of 1965 under amicable conditions. Id. at 99.
38. The constitution of the former Soviet Union prophetically contained a provi-
sion in article 17 that 'the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to
every Union Republic.* Id. at 100. See also Cass K Sunstein, Constitutionalism and
Secession, 58 U. CHa. L REv. 633 (1991). Including a right to secede in a constitu-
tion may in fact endanger the democratic process, rather than protect it. Sunstein
recognizes a right to secede under certain circumstances, but it should be considered
a natural part of constitutionalism and need not be expressly granted in the consti-
tution. Id. at 670. At least one commentator argues that the Confederate states
acted legally in seceding from the Union because the U.S. Constitution did not for-
bid secession. H. Newcomb Morse, The Foundations and Meaning of Secession, 15
STETSON L REV. 419 (1986). See also BUCHANAN, 8upra note 3, at 127-49 (discussing
constitutional provisions for secession).
39. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 100-01.
40. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Bush Baltic Move Seeks to Weep Pressure' On, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at Al (listing the countries that immediately established diplo-
matic ties with the Baltic states).
41. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 61. Political manipulation, along with the in-
herent inconsistency between self-determination and territorial integrity, removed the
international community and international law from playing a meaningful role in
resolving secessionist disputes. Eisner, supra note 4, at 416.
42. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 59.
43. Id. at 54.
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agenda. The Soviet Union disapproved of the dissolution of the Mali
Federation, where their influence was increasing, but supported the
secessionist movement in Bangladesh." The Soviet decision "was ap-
parently dictated by political expediency and not a principled judgment
regarding the legitimacy of the particular claim. ' The United States
recognized the legitimacy of secessionist movements in the former
Soviet Union but failed to recognize the legitimacy of other secessionist
struggles less favorable to U.S. interests. ' Even in recognizing the
independent Baltic nations, President Bush could not avoid phrasing
his support in self-serving nationalistic terms. "The Soviet Union is no
more... [and] this is a victory for democracy and freedom. The United
States applauds and supports the historic choice for freedom of the
new states... [and] these events clearly serve our national inter-
ests."'
Developing nations also have manipulated the principle of self-
determination, making its abuse a reality of international politics."
In fact, countries that recently gained independence - many times
through secession - from a colonial power under the auspices of self-
determination immediately deny the same right to groups within their
borders." The Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, summed up the
general feeling of African leaders when he said "that the national uni-
ty of individual African states was an 'essential ingredient for the
realization of the greater objective of African unity."" This attitude
contradicts the prevailing trend in international law of protecting hu-
44. BUCHHEMT, supra note 6, at 127.
46. Id.
46. The Kurds' struggle, for example, continues to be used as a political tool by
the United States and other countries to further their own self-interests in the re-
gion. Discussed infra at section V of this article.
47. Doyle McManus, Bush Praises Gorbachev, Recognizes 6 Republics, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1991, at Al (quoting a nationally televised address made by President Bush
on Dec. 25, 1991).
48. "The credo of the Third World has been aptly epitomized by Emerson to
read: 'My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is obviously un-
impeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is wholly inadmissi-
ble." PoMERANcE, supra note 5, at 61 (quoting in part Rupert Emerson, Self-Deter-
mination Revisited in the Era of Decolonialization (Occasional Papers in International
Affairs, no. 9; Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Dec., 1964)).
49. "Leaders of newly independent states have been consistently vocal in assert-
ing that the right to self-determination does not include the right of secession."
Nanda, supra note 5, at 271. African countries that obtained independence from
European countries by exercising their right to self-determination have been notori-
ously hypocritical in denying that right to groups within their artificially created
borders. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986, reprinted in 21 LL.M. 58 (1982) (Article 20 restricts self-
determination to colonial situations, while Article 29(5) requires the individual to
preserve the nation's territorial integrity). See generally POMERANCE, supra note 5, at
1-76.
50. Report of the OAU. Consultative Mission to Nigeria, cited in Nanda, supra
note 5, at 272.
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man rights, even over state rights, when the two conflict."
Although it would be difficult to assert that the United Nations
also has acted out of self-interest in its treatment of secessionist
claims, it is not unfair to conclude the U.N. has been ineffective at
best.52 In failing to regulate secessionist claims, the U.N. has allowed
states to freely pursue their own self-interests. When Biafra attempted
to secede from Nigeria, the U.N. somehow managed to ignore a thirty-
month, bloody civil war." In fact, the U.N. never even discussed the
conflict, even though Biafra took an appeal before the U.N. in Decem-
ber of 1967 charging Nigeria with human rights violations such as
genocide." In the absence of a collective international judgement re-
garding the legitimacy of Biafra's secessionist claim, states freely inter-
vened on behalf of the side most likely to further their own self-inter-
ests.' The U.N. was also conspicuously inactive in the subsequent
secessionist struggle between Bangladesh and Pakistan.' Once again,
the U.N. failed to even discuss the matter until India and Pakistan
were involved in a full-scale war." Bangladesh successfully seceded
from Pakistan primarily due to India's self-serving military interven-
tion." The one instance when the U.N. did intervene was in opposi-
tion to Katanga's effort to secede from the Congo, and even then the
U.N. waited until Belgium had intervened on behalf of Katanga.59
The U.N. justified this as preventing Belgium from recolonizing its
previous colony, refusing to intervene until there was a Western colo-
nial power involved, and applying self-determination to a narrowly
defined colonial context.'
The only certain lesson to be learned from examining state prac-
tice regarding self-determination and secession is that a state's re-
sponse to a given situation will usually be determined solely by its own
political interest." Thus, most states will be critical of secessionist
51. See Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary, 71 FOREIGN AF. 79 (Winter
1992/1993).
52. The U.N. has been criticized for creating two standards regarding the legiti-
macy of secession, allowing it when a colony secedes from a Western country but
denying it to any group within an existing state. See POMERANCE, supra note 5, at
17 (stating that an arbitrary requirement of colonial status is racist and subjective).
53. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 162-76.
54. See generally Documents: Biafra/Nigeria, 2 N.Y.U. J. INn L. & POL. 398
(1969), cited in Nanda, supra note 3, at 273 n.106.
55. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 170.
56. Nanda, supra note 5, at 274. See generally BUCHHErT, supra note 6, at 198-
215.
57. Nanda, supra note 5, at 274.
58. India stopped the massive flow of refugees from Bangladesh and weakened a
regional adversary, while gaining a potential ally. See generally Nanda, supra note 6.
59. Nanda, supra note 5, at 273-74. See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at
141-53.
60. See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 141-53.
61. Id. at 105.
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movements in other countries not affecting their own interests because
it creates a precedent, possibly legitimatizing secessionist struggles
that someday may occur within their own territory.m A state is al-
most certain, however, to intervene on behalf of one side in a seces-
sionist struggle if it will secure a new ally or defeat an old enemy.'
In light of the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War Era, states are likely to continue
promoting their own self-interests unless the U.N. actively evaluates
the legitimacy of secessionist claims by consistently applying agreed
upon criteria. States will still have the political tool of formal recog-
nition of statehood, but it should be restricted and in compliance
with U.N. standards.6
IV. STANDARDS AND CRITERIA FOR SECESSION
A group seeking to secede must first satisfy the requirements of
self-determination before accessing the extreme remedy of secession.
Attaining independence constitutes one of the methods by which the
ultimate goal of self-government may be obtained.' The right of self-
determination distinguishes legitimate claims of secession from illegiti-
mate claims." Although self-determination has reached the status of
customary international law, individuals can only exercise this right in
the context of a group.w Thus, the existence of an identifiable group
constitutes the first, and perhaps most ambiguous, criterion.0
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Arthur M. Cox, In a National Tailspin, the Soviet Union Must Fill the
Power Vacuum, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at M2.
65. "Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory
and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such enti-
ties." RESTATEMENT (THItD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
66. A state is not required to formally recognize another state but is required to
treat it as a state if the requirements for statehood are met, except when statehood
was attained by the use of armed conflict in violation of the U.N. Charter. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 202 (1987). Refusing to treat an entity
attempting to secede as a state may be required because premature acceptance
would violate the territorial integrity of the dominant state and military support
may violate the U.N. Charter. Id., § 202 cmt. f (1987).
67. Res. 1541, supra note 17. See Robert W. McGee, 77e Theory of Secession and
Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution, 28 STAN. J. INT L. 451 (1992)
(summarizing the basic arguments for and against secession).
68. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 162.
69. Although potentially arbitrary in nature, this limitation is sensible because
individuals are generally more likely to consent to be governed by people similar to
themselves and governments have historically tended to oppress distinct groups with-
in the population. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 228. But see Dov RONEN, THE QUEST
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 8 (1979); McGee, supra note 67, at 451 (stating that indi-
viduals have the unilateral right to secede but are inhibited in their exercise of that
right by practical and logistical restraints).
70. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 275. See also Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 192-93
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Group identity is determined through the application of both sub-
jective and objective standards.71 The subjective self-identity of a
group can be judged on the basis of a variety of common, objective
characteristics, including religion, language, ethnicity, and race.72
Group identity can also be based on "subjective expectations shared by
a significant number of people that their condition will be improved by
membership in that particular association.' A common claim to spe-
cific territory, rather than a common culture, also may define a
'group."" In addition to the problem of quantifying the subjective
mental state of group members, difficulties arise in evaluating the
objective criteria.7 Although the standards used to evaluate the exis-
tence of an identifiable group are somewhat ambiguous, refusing to
recognize a 'group' under all circumstances is unwarranted.76
. The relationship between group members and their leaders mea-
sures the cohesiveness of a group and the extent to which individual
members share common perceptions and values." The purported lead-
ers of a group should represent the opinions of the group as a whole.78
When the interests of the leaders are different from those of the group
in general, the claim will fail for lack of a legitimate identifiable
group."
A plebiscite clearly determines the general interests and choice of
the community' but requires an impartial third party like the U.N.,
established procedures, and parties willing to submit to the authority
of the procedure.8 The plebiscite itself is not the exercise of self-de-
(defining the group as people with a common claim to territory wrongly taken from
them, rather than in ethnic or cultural terms).
71. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 276; Iglar, supra note 31, at 214, 225.
72. See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 156-57; Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
73. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 786.
74. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 177-202 (defining a group based on
a common territorial claim seems less arbitrary and more objective than ethnicity
and culture).
75. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329. For example, to what extent should linguis-
tic dialects be considered as the same language or distinct languages? If 'culture' is
broadly defined, a group may be in effect penalized for exhibiting cultural pluralism.
Id.
76. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 200. International law should protect the right
to secede but prevent its abuse. The possibility that such abuses may occur, howev-
er, does not invalidate the law. Id.
77. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
78. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 816.
79. Id. An example of an illegitimate claim where the interests of the group and
its purported leaders were in conflict is the Southern Rhodesian unilateral declara-
tion of separation from Great Britain in 1965, where minority white leaders would
have continued to deny the black majority fundamental human rights. I&
80. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 163. But see PoMERANcE, supra note 5,
at 27 (arguing that a free and fair election is not a panacea but rather raises addi-
tional questions regarding who constitutes the real population of a territory).
81. Valentine, supra note 7, at 813. The U.N. has carried out several successful
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termination but merely a tool to determine whether an identifiable
group exists and how that group would exercise its self-determina-
tion.' Two other considerations must be resolved in order to carry out
an effective plebiscite: (1) establishing the percentage of the group re-
quired to authorize action; and (2) protecting those who are opposed.'
Furthermore, there are many more potentially legitimate groups than
possible viable states." Even though establishing the existence of an
identifiable group may be difficult enough to reduce some claims, addi-
tional criteria are needed in order to further limit the scope of seces-
sion as an option under self-determination."
In addition to satisfying the requirement of a 'group' as defined
above, a legitimate claim of self-determination and a right to secede
require some type of subjugation," which provides the most impor-
tant basis for authorizing self-determination and extending it to in-
dude secession. 7 The basis for declaring a status of subjugation de-
rives from the relationship between the ruling group and the group*
claiming a right to self-determination.' The relationship between a
ruling colonial power and its colony has most easily satisfied this crite-
rion. "Colonialism came to be branded not only as a 'permanent
aggression' but as a 'crime', and an evil so paramount [it] deserved...
to be eradicated by all possible means.' s 'Colonialism' eventually
came to include "social institutions which systematically and deliber-
plebiscites, including those in the British Cameroons, Rwanda, Sabah, and Sarawak.
See UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 183. However, the U.N. failed to apply internation-
ally accepted standards to the election in West Irian, instead allowing traditional
Indonesian practices to virtually guarantee that the state would join the Indonesian
Republic regardless of the people's genuine preference. POMERANCE, aupra note 5, at
33. For a general discussion on election monitoring, see YVES BEIGEEDER, INTERNA-
TIONAL MoNrToRING OF PLEBISCrEs, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTONS - SELF-
DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994).
82. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 163.
83. Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
84. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329.
85. A pure Parochialist Model only requires an identifiable group seeking control
of their political future, but the disruptive nature of allowing any identifiable group
to claim a right of self-determination as the basis for secession makes this view
almost entirely unaccepted. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 223-24.
86. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 157. -The beneficiary of the right of self-
determination is a self-conscious politically coherent community that is under the
political subjugation of another community." Id. at 156. But see Buchanan, supra
note 3, at 325 (arguing that since there is currently no theory of secession, it would
be inappropriate to reject secessionist claims based on grievances other than an
injustice, even though this might become the standard in the future).
87. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 157. The U.N. has evaluated virtually all
claims in light of this criteria. See, e.g., Res. 1514, supra note 17 ('The subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental human rights.").
88. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 157.
89. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 49.
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ately deprive particular groups of their human rights.'
A violation of fundamental human rights emerged as a substitute
criterion for subjugation, while colonialism became a per se violation of
fundamental human rights." Determining the degree and nature of
oppression against the group becomes the threshold test.' If members
in the group are exercising the rights of citizens, enjoying fundamental
human rights, and enhancing their political, cultural, and economic
development, no basis exists for claiming a right to self-determina-
tion." This appears to be the lex lata, with the degree of oppression
dictating the available remedy, which would range from protection of
minority rights to the ultimate remedy of secession."
An identifiable group suffering some type of human rights viola-
tion or subjugation satisfies the two criteria necessary for claiming a
right to self-determination but not necessarily the requirements for
claiming a right to secede. The international community tends to disfa-
vor outright secession, treating it is as a remedy of last resort.9
There is an implicit criterion that in order to completely legitimatize a
secessionist claim, the group first must make an effort to remedy the
problem through a less extreme alternative method." The disgruntled
group can add a degree of legitimacy to their secessionist claim if they
first attempt to remedy the problem through other channels.' This
criterion also requires a neutral third party, preferably the U.N., to
encourage negotiations between the disgruntled group and the govern-
ment and to determine if and when the group may legitimately claim a
right to secede. Requiring a disgruntled group to first attempt a reme-
dy short of secession eases some of the fears in the international com-
munity, making a liberal application of self-determination acceptable
to more states and increasing the likelihood truly legitimate secession-
ist claims outside the scope of decolonization will be recognized."
90. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 838.
91. See generally POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1-76.
92. See BuCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 220-23 (referring to this as Remedial Seces-
sion in contrast to the Parochial Model discussed supra in note 85).
93. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 268-69. It is argued that a truly democratic
government based on fair representation presumably fulfills the goal of self-deter-
mination, namely self-government, and weakens any claim of subjugation or human
rights violations. See id. at 185.
94. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 222.
95. See id. at 214. Remedies other than outright independence, such as autono-
my or association, may be adequate and more acceptable to the international com-
munity. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 189.
96. One suggested alternative is to let the subgroup retain its common personali-
ty, while encompassing their identification with the broader political body. Suzuki,
supra note 8, at 859.
97. By first attempting political and constitutional innovations through existing
constitutional channels before resorting to secession, the Tbos of Nigeria and Bengalis
of Bangladesh added legitimacy to their claim. Id. at 805.
98. See OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 189.
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Whether a group must have a territorial claim in order to legiti-
mately secede is currently under debate." Semantically, to secede
merely means to withdraw from a larger organization, implying that
the group must have somewhere to go. A group may secede and join
another state through association or integration, requiring no territori-
al claim of its own./" Furthermore, no territorial claim has been re-
quired for secessionist claims in a colonial context."1 It is logical,
however, to require a territorial claim when a group secedes from a
sovereign country and does not join another state, since the group
must take territory from an existing state.1 "2
A strict territorial interpretation requires a valid claim to territo-
ry, usually based on an historical grievance, in order to access seces-
sion as a legitimate remedy.1" A minority group without a territorial
claim suffering human rights violations still has a grievance, but it
cannot legitimately claim secession as a remedy. 0 ' An historical
grievance arises from a wrongful acquisition of territory. The remedy,
including possibly secession, is proportionate to the responsibility of
the dominant party in power in wrongfully acquiring that territory. "
Furthermore, under a modified territorial interpretation, a valid ter-
ritorial claim may automatically satisfy the subjugation criterion if the
territory was unjustly incorporated into the larger state.'" Recently,
this was a significant justification for secessionist movements within
99. See Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 177-202 (arguing that a territorial claim
based on an historical grievance is the only legitimate claim to secede). See also
BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 229-30 (requiring a territorial claim for groups to actual-
ly secede but not to politically remove themselves); Suzuki, supra note 8, at 782 (the
group demanding separation must have an appropriate territorial base); Valentine,
supra note 7, at 818-19 (stating that an identifiable land base is an indicium of a
secessionist claim). But see OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164 (a territorial
claim is only relevant when the boundaries are in dispute); Buchanan, supra note 3,
at 332 (arguing discriminatory redistribution justifies secession absent any territorial
claim).
100. OFuATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164. See also Res. 1541, supra note 17.
But see Nanda, supra note 6, at 277 (legitimatizing secession based on such princi-
ples would undermine international stability).
101. See OPUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164; Buchanan, supra note 3, at
332.
102. Without a valid territorial claim, the group would in effect take on the sta-
tus of refugees or emigrants. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 326-27 (stating that seces-
sionists only deny the authority of the state over the group and the territory they
occupy, not the state's authority in general).
103. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 192.
104. Id. at 193. But see Buchanan, supra note 3, at 328 (agreeing with Brilmayer
in part but denying that a territorial claim based on an historical grievance is the
only justification for secession).
105. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 197 (claiming colonialism is an automatic justifi-
cation for an historical grievance and thus a right to secede).
106. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329-30. This theory is most plausible when the
group seeking to secede is the same group that held legitimate title to the territory
when it was unjustly annexed. Id
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the former Soviet Union.1°7
A state created by secession must be politically and economically
viable, so as not to burden the international community."u This crite-
rion is easier to meet today than in the past, given the emergence of
many small, but successful, nation-states.' The U.N. codified a re-
laxed standard in Resolution 1514, which declares "inadequacy of polit-
ical, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve
as a pretext for delaying independence."1 Technological advances
and the development of international economic and military alliances
have reduced the necessity for a large land base."1 The U.N. would
evaluate the state's viability by considering the population, size, natu-
ral resources, and infrastructure. Unlike other criteria, the U.N. might
consider the willingness of existing states to recognize the new state,
since viability is largely dependent upon economic and political allies.
Although viability may not be determinative alone, it should be consid-
ered along with other factors in evaluating the strengths of the seces-
sionist claim.
The overall method for evaluating a secessionist claim is a balanc-
ing test, primarily weighing the benefits of allowing secession against
the burdens." A seceding group has at least three tools at its dispos-
al to achieve its goal of secession: (1) international pressure; (2) moral
persuasion; and (3) brute force. " 8 The ultimate goal is to maximize
world harmony by striking a balance between individual human rights
and state sovereignty.1 ' The level of disruption in the international
community is the determinative factor. "' This disruption includes
the effect of secession on the remaining state. For example, would the
loss of land, people, or resources critically impair the viability of the
remaining state?1 . The disruptive factor is also measured by the ef-
fect of the secession on other nations. Additional considerations include
the precedent of allowing a successful secession and the impact of
107. Id. at 329. See also Now the U.S. Should Help the Baltics Join the UN,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1991, at 58 (stating that the Baltic states were forcibly and ille-
gally incorporated into the Soviet Union in a secret deal between Stalin and Hitler
in 1940).
108. See BUCHHErT, supra note 6, at 29.
109. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 834-35.
110. Res. 1514, supra note 17.
111. See Valentine, supra note 7, at 811 nn. 48-49.
112. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 238-45.
113. Frankel, supra note 4, at 530.
114. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 238-45 (referring to this as the Utilitarian Ap-
proach, in contrast to the Parochial Model, supra note 85, and Remedial Secession,
supra note 92).
115. Id. The fundamental goal is optimum public order. Suzuki, supra note 8, at
793.
116. The amount of disruption is high if secession threatens to remove a key
economic base of the country, as was the case when Katanga attempted to secede
from Nigeria. BUcHHErr, supra note 6, at 232.
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armed conflict or an influx of refugees on surrounding nations. The
ability of the seceding entity to survive independently and to abide by
international law are also important factors.'17 Finally, the current
disruption and potential future disruption likely to occur if the group
is not allowed to secede must be evaluated." Continuing violations
of jus cogens may be so repulsive to the international community that
its disruptiveness outweighs that of a secessionist struggle."9 The
use of force and violence will also be a key element in determining the
degree of disruptiveness.' °
It is a difficult task to reconcile the idealistic goal of prohibiting
the use of force under international law as a method of achieving goals
and the pragmatic reality that some degree of force will inevitably be
used. The use of force or violence by either the secessionist group or
the dominant state will draw the attention of the international com-
munity. ' The use of power is closely related to the issue of re-
spect. ' "Coercive operations without the support of the world com-
munity will deprive the coercers of respect."' The willingness of a
secessionist group to enter into an armed struggle, however, demon-
strates group identity and resolve.' It may also shift world opinion
in their favor if the dominant state resorts to an overwhelming use of
force to repress the secessionist movement, as was the case when Paki-
stan began fighting Bangladesh ' and when the Yugoslavian army
harshly responded to secessionist movements.' On the other hand,
if the secessionist group appears to be nothing more than a terrorist
organization, they will lose any chance for legitimacy in the interna-
tional community. Unfortunately, nations within the world community
historically have responded to secessionist struggles when their politi-
cal self-interests required such action."
117. If international charity will likely become the method for maintaining eco-
nomic viability, the international community has a legitimate concern. Id.
118. Id. at 235.
119. Namibia Case, supra note 22, at 72. The internal conditions of human rights
within a country and the level of international order are interrelated, thereby mak-
ing gross violations of human rights a concern of the international community.
Suzuki, supra note 8, at 836-37.
120. See Valentine, supra note 7, at 819-20.
121. Id. at 819.
122. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 855.
123. Id.
124. See Namibia Case, supra note 22 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.) (stating
that the Namibian people asserted their international personality through violent
struggle), cited in Valentine, supra note 7, at 819.
125. See generally, Nanda, supra note 6, at 321-36.
126. See Jill Smolowe, Yugoslavia: Out of Control, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 26. At
first, European and U.S. officials reacted negatively to secessionist movements, call-
ing for the preservation of territorial integrity. They changed their position after the
Yugoslavian army acted violently, calling for self-determination. Id.
127. Frankel, supra note 4, at 531.
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The effect of violence on the legitimacy of a secessionist claim
must be evaluated using the twin criteria of necessity and proportion-
ality.' When the secessionist group resorts to the use of force unnec-
essarily and without provocation, the state may use a proportionate
amount of force in response.' If the state uses unnecessary and dis-
proportionate force to suppress a peaceful effort to secede, however,
this may constitute a human rights violation or subjugation, adding
legitimacy to the secessionist claim.' Thus, the use of force cannot
be completely prohibited, but it also should not be rewarded.
Legal and political issues also should be considered in evaluating
the burdens of allowing secession. The legal considerations .would in-
clude pacta sunt servanda, territorial integrity, prohibition against the
use of force, recognition, and nonintervention."'1 Political consider-
ations would include the fear of balkanization, fragmentation, and
destabilization of the international community.' The dominant state
may justifiably invoke self-defense as a basis for denying secession if a
successful secession would end the existence of the remaining
state." The secessionist group must be willing and able to protect
the individual rights of its members after attaining independence. This
argument can be extended to deny secession on the grounds that the
new state would not only deny its current members fundamental
rights but also future members their fundamental rights.' 4 The po-
tential abuse of using the threat of secession as a bargaining tool to
obtain disproportionate political power, contrary to a theory of majority
rule, also causes concern." Finally, the most frequently cited burden
of allowing secession is that there would be no way of limiting it once
the process began, resulting in complete anarchy.'
In order to overcome an inherent bias against secession,"3 7 the
benefits must clearly outweigh the perceived burdens. Furthermore,
the seceding entity must demonstrate viability through de facto con-
trol.' Since the state suffers a burden to some extent in any seces-
sionist claim, the group and the international community must demon-
128. These are the same two criteria used to justify self-defense claims under
international law. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of
United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 AM. J. INVL L.
494 (1990).
129. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 237.
130. Id.
131. Nanda, supra note 5, at 263.
132. Id. at 264.
133. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 332-35 (stating that self-defense will only justify
denying secession under stringently confined circumstances).
134. Id. at 335-36 (referring to this as the 'soft paternalist argument').
135. Id. at 336-37 (calling this the 'strategic bargaining argument').
136. See, e.g., id. at 337-39.
137. Frankel, supra note 4, at 535-38.
138. Id. at 534.
Vol. 22:2,3
KURDS' RIGHT TO SECESSION
strate a significant benefit. The primary consideration in determining
the benefits of secession is the degree of subjugation or violation of hu-
man rights suffered by the secessionist group and the extent to which
secession would eliminate the problem.' The benefit of returning
territory wrongfully taken from the seceding group is another consider-
ation."0 A secessionist claim that truly advances fundamental human
rights is consistent with the recent willingness of the international
community to emphasize individual human rights over state
rights. ' The international community, as well as the parties in-
volved, may benefit from allowing secession rather than requiring a
disgruntled group to remain in the existing state through the use of
force. In addressing the Yugoslavian situation, German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl stated that "countries cannot be held together by tanks
and force."14
A somewhat obscure argument made by Leopold Kohr, an Austri-
an-born economist, is worth noting as the international community
undergoes significant change. He believed that the spirit among people
who regain national independence would lead to many positive results,
including "peace, economic revival, a flowering of the arts and true
participation by all citizens in democratic government."1 '" Further-
more, secession does not necessarily mean permanent disunion and
anarchy as once thought. The newly independent states will freely
reorganize themselves in order to prosper in the international mar-
ket.' Lastly, the widespread acceptance of self-determination as
customary international law demonstrates the principle's strong appeal
and benefits."'4 These inherent benefits in allowing people to freely
determine their government should reduce the traditional bias against
secession, making it easier to satisfy the balancing test in favor of
secession.
V. THE KURDS
In examining the effect of self-determination on the Kurds and
applying the above criteria to their situation, several startling conclu-
sions may be drawn. First, few groups (peoples) can make a stronger
139. See generally id.
140. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 802-24; Buchanan, supra note 3, at
322-42.
141. See Suzuki, supra note 8, at 862 (concluding that a choice should be made
that establishes the enjoyment of all human rights as the fundamental basis).
142. Smolowe, supra note 126, at 26.
143. John McClaughry, A Visionary of Disunion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, § 1,
at 19.
144. See New Slant on Union, CHRISTIAN ScIENcE MoNMITR, Dec. 11, 1991, at 20.
145. For some members of the U.N., self-determination "has become the preemp-
tory norm of international law, capable of overriding all other international legal
norms and even such other possible preemptory (sic] norms as the prohibition of the
threat or use of force." POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
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case for self-determination than the Kurds.' Second, the Kurds have
a strong, although not infallible, claim to a right of secession under the
above criteria. Third, the international manipulation of the Kurds
exemplifies the historical use of self-determination and secession as
tools for selfishly furthering state interests at the expense of human
rights. Lastly, the Kurds have suffered greatly from the lack of an
international institution capable of regulating secessionist claims.
In order to claim a right to self-determination, the Kurds must
demonstrate that they (1) constitute an identifiable group; and (2) are
suffering some type of significant grievance. Substantial objective evi-
dence supports the conclusion that the Kurds are a distinct and identi-
fiable group.14 They are the descendants of the biblical Medes'
thus giving them a common ethnicity. Furthermore, the Kurds have
strikingly different physical features from other peoples living in the
region. " The Kurds are Aryan, making them racially different from
many other regional groups.' The Kurds speak a distinct language
of the Indo-European group, in contrast to the Semitic-speaking Arabs
in Iraq and Turkic speakers in Turkey."l The Kurds are generally
Sunni Muslims, whereas the state religion in Iran is Shiism.152 Last-
ly, the Kurds have a long nomadic tradition and a distinct culture.'
The Kurds also subjectively consider themselves a distinct people,
further strengthening the proposition that they are an identifiable
group. In addition to the numerous objective criteria listed above, the
strongest evidence supporting the Kurds subjective group identity is
that they have managed to retain their distinct culture and ethnicity
even though they are a minority population in several different coun-
tries.' The largest Kurd populations are in Turkey (up to 10 mil-
146. Turkey's Kurds, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 3, 1992, at 20. See gen-
erally YOSEF GOTrLIEB, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 72-105 (1982);
Sarah E. Whitesell, The Kurdish Crisis: An International Incident Study, 21 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POLV 455 (1993).
147. See generally MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN, AGHA, SHAIKH AND STATE: THE SO-
CIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF KURnDISTAN (1992) (discussing Kurd loyalties);
DAVID McDOwAu., THE KURDS - A NATION DENIED (1992) (discussing internal and
external barriers to establishing a Kurdish nation); NADER ENTESSAR, KURDISH
ETHNONATIONALISM (1992) (using the Kurds to illustrate how an ethnic group can
refuse to integrate into contemporary nation-states).
148. See STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE, THE KURDS: AN UNSTABLE ELEMENT IN THE
GULF 20-23 (1984).
149. See id. at 16 (stating that the Kurds are renowned for their striking physical
features, which have been largely preserved by not interacting with other peoples).
150. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 158-62 (discussing the Kurds); PELLETIERE,
supra note 148, at 19.
151. PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 19.
152. See id.
153. See Turkey's Kurds, supra note 146, at 20.
154. Kurds: The State that Never Was, ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), June 24, 1989, at
38 [hereinafter Kurds]. See also Stephen Fay, Born Losers?, INDEPENDENT (London),
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lion), Iran (up to 5 million), and Iraq (up to 4 million).IM The poor
treatment received by the Kurds in different countries throughout
history caused one Kurdish leader to refer to his people as the "or-
phans of the universe."' It is no wonder that Kurds identify more
closely with other Kurds than with the people of the state in which
they reside.
The Kurds' nomadic nature and their traditional allegiance to
tribal leaders somewhat weakens their group identity." This faction-
alism is still apparent in modem Kurdish politics, where at least three
different leaders lead three different parties and each demands a dif-
ferent degree of autonomy for the Kurds.' In Iraq, the Kurdish Par-
liament is split evenly between Mr. Barzani's Kurdish Democratic
Party and Mr. Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 5 In Turkey,
the radicle Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continues to fight a gorilla
war in an effort to secede from Turkey. With more than 10,500
deaths" and indiscriminate terrorist attacks in Europe, the PKK
has lost a great deal of credibility in the world community.1 61 Al-
though factionalism and terrorism may weaken the cohesiveness of the
Kurds, the fact that leaders are using free elections to determine the
opinion of the majority of Kurds regarding independence strengthens
their group identity." Furthermore, only a small minority of the
reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., June, 1991, at 17 (stating that the Kurds have
retained their identity for 2,500 years as a subject people).
155. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
156. Id.
157. PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 18. Graham E. Fuller, The Fate of the Kurds,
72 FOR. AFF. 108 (1993) (stating that the Kurds have not yet obtained statehood
because (1) it has not been convenient for the international community and (2) the
Kurds own factionalism has kept them from fully uniting).
158. See Ayse Sarioglu, Turkey's Rebel Kurds Go Separate Way From Iraqi Kurds,
The Reuter Library Report, Apr. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
File (discussing the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan,
who wants independence for the Kurds); Kurt Schork, Kurdish Leader Barzani Takes
His Autonomy Deal to the People, The Reuter Library Report, Oct. 18, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (contrasting Massoud Barzani, leader of
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), who wants to discuss Kurdish autonomy with
Iraq, and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who is
less willing to negotiate with Iraq).
159. John Darnton, Almost a Nation: The Kurds in Iraq - A Special Report;
Kurds Rebuilding Shattered Land, Winning a Precarious Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1994, at Al.
160. See, e.g., Bloodiest Year for Kurd Separatists, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993, at 2
[hereinafter Bloodiest Year].
161. See, e.g., Steve Vogel, Kurdish Separatist Party Outlawed by Germany; Group
Blamed for Attacks on Turkish Targets, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at A22; Steve
Crawshaw, Trial Tests Munich's Policy on Kurds, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 13, 1994, at 9.
But see Kevin McKiernan, Turkey Terrorizes its Kurds: Another U.S. Ally Deploys
Death Squads, 57 THE PROGREsswE 28 (1993).
162. See Kurds Want Self-Determination, Not Independence, Agence France Presse,
May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File [here-
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overall Kurdish population engages in terrorist activity' and in re-
sponse to egregious violations of their fundamental human rights.'"
If a territorial standard is applied to define the group,'" Kurds
would still constitute an identifiable group because they have a com-
mon claim to the same territory, known as Kurdistan. Nearly seven-
teen to twenty million Kurds inhabit the Taurus and Zagros moun-
tains where they have lived for centuries." Therefore, the Kurds are
an identifiable group applying any of the three standards - objective,
subjective, or territorial.'"
In addition to proving they are an identifiable group, the Kurds
must prove that they are suffering some type of substantial grievance
in order to claim a right to self-determination. This could be in the
form of subjugation, a violation of human rights, or deprivation of a
legitimate territorial claim. The Kurds can more than adequately satis-
fy this criterion, given the numerous atrocities committed against
them, including a violation of the international jus cogens prohibiting
genocide.' In the past twenty-two years, more than 200,000 Kurds
have been slaughtered in Iraq alone.'" More than four thousand
Kurds were murdered by Saddam Hussein in Halabja in a single cloud
of deadly poison gas,7 while eight thousand men from the Barzani
tribe disappeared without a trace.""
In addition to outright genocide, the Kurds have been systemati-
inafter Self-Determination].
163. See Tom Hundly, Rough Road for Mainstream Kurds; War on Minority
Makes it Hard to Think like a Turk', CiH. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1994, at N7.
164. See, e.g., Robert R. Koenig, Groups Alleging Turkish Hypocrisy in Helping
Kurds, ST. LOIS PoST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1994, at 5C (stating that a recent report
by Amnesty International found increasingly widespread, systematic human rights
violations targeted primarily at the Kurds in Turkey); Bob Hepburn, Paper Champi-
ons Kurdish Autonomy, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 17, 1994, at C5 (reporting that at least
sixteen employees of a Kurdish newspaper in Turkey have been killed since the
paper first appeared in early 1992).
165. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
166. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
•167. See MAXIME RODINSON, Preface to A.R. GHASSEMLOU ET AL., PEOPLE WITH-
OUT A COUNTRY: THE KuRDS AND KURDISTAN 1-7 (Gerard Chaliand ed. & Michael
Pailis trans., 1980). "The rights of the Kurdish people should be obvious to every-
body. We have here a specifically defined people with a language and a culture all
their own . . . living in a geographically coherent area, and refusing en masse the
cultural assimilation which others seek to impose upon them." Id. at 4.
168. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
GA Res. 96, Dec. 11, 1946, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1946). See Betraying the Kurds Again,
JERusALEM POST, Apr. 7, 1991, at Op-Ed, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [herein-
after Betraying the Kurds].
169. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168, at Op-Ed (statistics from the Commit-
tee for the Study of Genocide in Gottingen, Sweden).
170. See Wretched Kurds, ECONOMIST, June 24, 1989, at 16 available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wire File.
171. Id.
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cally discriminated against in Turkey and Iraq on the basis of racial,
linguistic, and religious differences.172 In Turkey, Kurds are referred
to as "Mountain Turks," denying their existence even in name."'
Turkey banned the Kurds from wearing traditional Kurdish clothing
and from using the Kurdish language. 17 ' In addition to violating the
basic human rights of the Kurds, Turkey has followed a policy of forc-
ible assimilation.7 In Iraq, demolition squads leveled entire Kurd
villages, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless."' This oppression
coupled with acts of genocide are more than sufficient to establish a
legitimate grievance based on human rights violations. It would be
absurd to claim that the Kurds are exercising the rights of citizens,
enjoying fundamental human rights, and enhancing their political,
cultural, and economic development under such oppressive condi-
tions.7 The Kurds, an identifiable group suffering a substantial
grievance, satisfy the two criteria necessary to establish a right to
exercise self-determination and possibly access the extreme remedy of
secession.
The Kurds also have a legitimate claim to territory based on an
historical grievance. 8 If the Kurds obtain their freedom in the form
of an autonomous region within the borders of an existing state - as
in the case of Iraqi Kurds - a territorial claim is only useful in defin-
ing boundaries. If, however, the Kurds secede and establish an inde-
pendent Kurdistan, they will need a valid territorial claim, since they
will be taking territory from at least one existing state. The Kurds
have occupied the same territorial region for four thousand years.'79
The Kurds fought various opponents throughout history but managed
172. See PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 19. See generally. MICHAEL M. GUNTER,
THE KURDS IN TURKEY: A POLITCAL DILEMMA (1990); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DE-
STROYING ETHNIC IDENTITY - THE KURDS OF TURKEY (Updated Sept., 1990) (A Hel-
sinki Watch Report).
173. Andrew Borowiec, Kurds' Dreams Shatter Again, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991,
at A8 (the word "Kurd" was completely banned until recently); Kurds, supra note
154, at 38. "No where else in the world is a group of people as large as the Kurds
deprived not only of national rights, but of their identity as people, different racially
and linguistically." Kurds Existence Denied in Turkey, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 25, 1994,
at A26.
174. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
175. Turkey's Kurds, supra 146 at 20.
176. Unsolved Kurdistan, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 44 available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wire File.
177. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
178. See Kurdish Leader Talabani Warns of New "War of Extermination," Voice of
the People of Kurdistan, Nov. 10 1991, translated by the BBC, Nov. 12, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File. At the time Iraqi Kurdistan was annexed
to the newly established Iraqi state in 1924, Britain and Iraq promised to respect
the Kurdish people's right to live on their land. The current Iraqi government is
now violating these obligations. Id.
179. Fay, supra note 154, at 17.
1994
DENY. J. INTL L. & POLY
to stay on their historic homeland and retain their distinct culture.'
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) provided for an independent country of
Kurdistan but was rejected by the Turkish hero Ataturk."' The Trea-
ty of Lausanne (1923) replaced the former treaty but failed to include
an independent Kurdish nation."18 Subsequently the Kurds fought
the British in Iraq and then the Iraqis themselves, attempting to ob-
tain an independent or autonomous homeland." In 1946, the Irani-
an Kurds established an independent republic in Mahabad, but it
lasted less than one year.' " The fact that the Kurds have inhabited
the same territory for thousands of years, despite efforts to annihilate
or assimilate them, establishes a legitimate claim to the territory. An
argument can be made to satisfy the historical grievance requirement
of a strict territorial interpretation, since any prior incorporation of
Kurd territory was a wrongful acquisition.' The current govern-
ments in Iraq and Turkey are directly responsible for the continued
violation of human rights and denial of Kurd autonomy.'
Kurd leaders have recently attempted to resolve their desire for
freedom with remedies that stop short of outright secession,"7 fur-
ther legitimatizing their claim in the eyes of the international commu-
nity.' Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party,
articulated his goals when he said "now we are looking for autono-
my... [and] no one can deny us as Kurds our right to self-determina-
tion. Just as European peoples have that right, so do we."' Peace-
fully achieving autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq are
Barzani's expressed political goals.' ' He recognized, however, that
the Kurds have the right to be completely free but current realities of
the international community limit the Kurds to seeking autonomy. 9'
The existence of several Kurdish political parties with different plat-
180. See generally id.
181. See Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
182. See id.
183. See Fay, supra note 154, at 17 (giving a concise history of the Kurds' territo-
rial struggle).
184. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
185. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 105 and accompanying text describing the dominant parties'
wrongful acquisition of territory and the Kurds' right to secession.
187. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168 (stating the declared goal of the Kurds
is autonomy, not secession); Nick B. Williams, Kurds - Iraq Begin Peace Negotia-
tions, LA TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al (Kurdish Democratic Party leaders do not
advocate secession, but rather autonomy). But see Sarioglu, supra note 158 (stating
the PKK leader wants independence, not autonomy).
188. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
189. Schork, supra note 158.
190. Id.
191. Iraqi Kurdish Leader Says Elections Important for International Credibility,
Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Apr. 13, 1992, translated by BBC, Apr. 15, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File.
398 Vol. 22:2,3
KURDS' RIGHT TO SECESSION
forms evidences a functioning democracy. In fact, the Kurds elected a
parliament and cabinet to manage Kurdistan's affairs, including the
preparation for autonomy under a federal system." This should
strengthen the Kurds' claim, rather than weaken it, since it demon-
strates political viability and international credibility.'
Iraqi Kurds inherited a de facto independent state as a result of
the power vacuum created after the Gulf War.'" The U.N. sanctions
have provided the Iraqi Kurds protection under a "no-fly zone" from
further military attacks by Iraq.' The U.N. sanctions, however, also
hurt the Iraqi Kurds because the embargo against Iraq, coupled with
Iraq's embargo against the Kurds, creates a "double embargo" that
prevents desperately needed food and medicine from reaching- the
Kurds.' Leaders of the Iraqi Kurds continue to declare that their
goal is a unified federation of Iraq, containing an autonomous
Kurdistan.' Average Kurdish citizens in Iraq, however, are less
diplomatic, voicing their support for an independent Kurdistan.'
For now, Iraqi Kurds continue to face grave hardships but at least live
in an autonomous state under the leadership of their own elected offi-
cials, free from discrimination and genocide. Therefore, Iraqi Kurds
have obtained, at least for now, an autonomous state in which they
exercise political independence. This should be viewed as a positive
development under international law. The international community in
general, and the U.S. specifically, should not allow further political
manipulation of the Iraqi Kurds, but rather support and recognize
their autonomy. The U.S. should be willing to allow the Kurds to freely
exercise their right of self-determination, which may include full inde-
pendence through secession if, and when, the Kurds decide that is
192. See, e.g., Kurdistan Local Government Official on Restructuring Economy,
Secession, Voice of the People of Kurdistan, June 8, 1992, translated by BBC, June
10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File; PUK Radio Says Opposition
Must Clarify its Stance on Federalism, Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Sept. 24,
1992, translated by the BBC, Sept. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBC File. In 1992, Iraqs 4 million Kurds held "their first free and fair elections -
internationally observed and perhaps the freest elections ever held in any Arab
country." The Kurds New Democracy, June 1, 1992, WASH. POST, at A18.
193. The Kurds' New Democracy, WASH. POST, June 1, 1992, at A18.
194. See, e.g., James O'Shea, Kurds Make Democracy Amid Iraq Dictatorship;
Neighboring States Fear any Notion of Autonomy, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1994, at Cl;
Scott Steele & Michael Georgy, Gulf War Orphans; Iraq's Kurds Face Hunger and
War this Winter, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 4, 1993, at 54.
195. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.LM. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 688].
196. See, eg., Kurdistan Trapped Between Twin Embargoes, NPR SHOW: ALL
THiNGs CONSIDERED, Feb. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
197. See, e.g., Iraq's Kurds; Surviving, with Difficulty, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at
48; Fuller, supra note 157, at n.3.
198. Observers report that while Kurdish leaders espouse the official position of
advocating an autonomous Kurdish state within an Iraqi federation, individual Kurds
desire full independence. See, eg., Darnton, supra note 159 at, Al.
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prudent.
The fact remains, however, that while the Kurds have obtained an
autonomous region - if not a de facto Kurdistan - in Iraq, they re-
main subjected to government control in other countries. Even the
future autonomy of Iraqi Kurds remains uncertain because it results
solely from protection provided by foreign military forces.' The radi-
cal PKK Party continues to fight a vicous gorilla war in Turkey. Addi-
tionally, the PKK openly demands full secession from Turkey. While
fighting the Kurds within Turkey, the Turkish Government has ex-
pressed a willingness to recognize and even protect Iraqi Kurds from
attack. In fact, Turkey remains vehemently opposed to Kurd activities
within its borders and continues to violate fundamental human rights
including banning Kurd participation in the political process. Although
the Kurds in Turkey and Iran have not inherited a de facto indepen-
dent state, they continue to seek independence or autonomy in order to
escape from the never ending violations of their fundamental human
rights.
The primary difference between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish
Kurds results from the political environment in which they live. While
Iraqi Kurds inherited their own state after the Gulf War, Turkish
Kurds have been forced to fight for their very existence against a coun-
try with strong ties to Europe and the United States. While Iraqi
Kurds were murdered by the arch enemy of the developed world, Turk-
ish Kurds used terrorist tactics in Europe. As perceived by the U.S.,
Iraqi Kurds are good, innocent victims and Turkish Kurds are bad
terrorists. Certainly the PKK Party in Turkey utilizes extreme mea-
sures and verges on outright terrorism, while the Iraqi Kurds receive
protection from the U.N., thereby directly affecting the credibility of
both Kurdish struggles. Regardless, all Kurds deserve the opportunity
to exercise their right of self-determination, which may include return-
ing a portion of existing countries to establish an independent
Kurdistan.
In order to establish a strong case for an autonomous region or
independence, the Kurds must demonstrate political and economic via-
bility.' The Iraqis themselves have acknowledged the potential eco-
nomic viability of an independent Kurdistan by not including certain
oil-producing towns like Kirkuk in the proposed autonomous re-
gion."' The Kurds should not be barred from establishing an autono-
199. The resolve of the United States faces uncertainty in the aftermath of a
tragic military accident on April 14, 1994 that killed twenty-six people when two
U.S. warlanes shot-down two U.S. helicopters over northern Iraq. See, e.g., Rethink
the Job in Iraq, INVL HERALD TRaB., Apr. 18, 1994, at Opinion. But see Caryle Mur-
phy, 'It's Important Work; U.S. Still Committed to Protecting Kurds, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 1994, at Al.
200. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
201. Mouna Naim, Iraqi Kurdish Leader Pessimistic [sic] on Baghdad Talks,
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mous or independent state, given the relaxed standard of viability set
forth in U.N. Resolution 1514' and the proven success of nations
with a much smaller land and resource base. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds
have demonstrated political and economic viability, even under ex-
tremely adverse conditions.
The level of disruptiveness is a key element in weighing the bene-
fits of allowing secession' with the burdens. This balancing test is
the final standard by which to evaluate the Kurds' situation.' Iraq
and Turkey would be hypocritical to claim that the loss of Kurdistan
would overly burden them, given the hostile treatment of the Kurds
and destruction of their territory. The current level of disruption to the
international community is extremely high. In 1991, for example, some
250,000 Kurds became refugees in Turkey, 100,000 in Iran, and anoth-
er 150,000 were bombed by Iraqi forces while trying to reach the bor-
der.' The repugnant acts of genocide suffered by the Kurds are also
disruptive to the international community. Creating an independent
Kurdistan would eliminate the refugee problem faced by neighboring
countries and the financial burden on the West in funding relief pro-
grams. The Kurds would greatly benefit from an independent home-
land, where they would at least be free from state sponsored genocide
and have their basic human rights protected.
The amount of violence involved in the struggle is a factor in
determining overall disruptiveness. In light of the massive force, in-
cluding chemical weapons, used against the Kurds, their response
generally has met the twin criteria of necessity and proportionali-
ty.' However, the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), an ex-
tremist faction engaged in terrorist attacks, has killed more than
10,500 people since 1984, including civilians.' This same faction is
also the most outspoken proponent of secession, thus negatively af-
fecting the international community's perception of the broader
Kurdish struggle. The members of this extremist faction involved in
terrorist activities represents a small proportion of the total number of
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence
France Presse File (stating that Kirkuk "could constitute the economic basis for
secession').
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
203. Although the majority of Kurd leaders are not yet demanding a right to
secession, the minority leaders who are may gain influence as secessionist struggles
in other countries succeed.
204. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
205. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168.
206. Martin Woollacott, The Tragic Collapse of a Revolution, GUARDIAN (London),
reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., June 1991, at 16, 17 (the Kurds cannot be blamed
for trying to rebel against Iraq); Wretched Kurds, supra note 170, at 16 (stating that
the Kurds may seem troublesome, but they have been continually abused and ex-
cluded).
207. Bloodiest Year, supra note 160, at 2.
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Kurds affected by Iraqi and Turkish aggression. Even Turkish leaders
who continue to fight the PKK faction have declared that "[i]t is imper-
ative that the international community and the media recognize the
clear distinction between the Kurdish issue and international terror-
ism, of which PKK is a part.' ° The massive force used against mil-
lions of displaced Kurds, including the annihilation of hundreds of
thousands, outweighs the force used by one extremist faction, thus
justifying the Kurds' overall use of force.
Other legal and political considerations also lead to the conclusion
that the balance is in favor of allowing the Kurds a right to secede.
Nonintervention and territorial integrity are hollow principles if they
allow a state to systematically exterminate an entire sub-culture of its
population. Self-determination outweighs any incompatible princi-
ples," especially when there is a violation of an established jus
cogens, i.e. genocide, which is inherently unjustifiable.21 The plight
of the Kurds is so wretched that intervening in Iraq's affairs is the
least risky course available to the West and the one most likely to save
lives.2" In weighing the human rights of individuals against the
rights of a state, the enjoyment of all human rights emerges as the
fundamental goal." If the international community plans to actually
implement their declared preference for emphasizing human rights
over state rights, there is no better opportunity than in the context of
the Kurds. The Kurds provide an opportunity for the U.N., U.S., and
other nations to recognize the need for structural changes in order to
protect fundamental human rights, "even at the cost of inevitable in-
stability. n1
VI. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Kurds are certainly entitled to the right of self-determination
and would have an extremely strong case for secession. The reluctance
of the international community to intervene in an effective manner
largely results from states acting solely in their own self-interests.
Various countries have manipulated the Kurds in order to maintain a
balance of power in the region. The Kurdish Independence movement
of the 1960s and 1970s failed largely due to Cold War politics, when
both the United States and the Soviet Union had an overriding inter-
208. PKK Terrorists, LA TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at B7 (printing a letter from the
Consul General of Turkey).
209. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
210. See THORNBERRY, supra note 33, at 57-100 (discussing the prohibition of
genocide under international law).
211. Intervention and Responsibility, WORLD PRESS REV., June 1991, at 19 (ex-
cerpt taken from the ECONOMIST).
212. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
213. Fuller, supra note 157.
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est in stabilizing the region. " The United States and Iran supported
the Kurds as they fought against Iraq, but the only goal was to weak-
en Iraq, not to give the Kurds independence.21 In March of 1975,
hostilities between Iran and Iraq terminated and so did military sup-
port for the Kurds."'6 The ultimate aim of the United States in sup-
porting the Kurds was to weaken Iraq, which was an ally of the Soviet
Union.217
It was a great betrayal which has burned itself into the memory of
the Kurdish people; an oppressed minority in all the states where
they are dispersed, the Kurds have all too frequently linked their
struggles to the realpolitik of the powerful, serving as useful but
always dispensable tools in the perennial Middle Eastern game of
nations.1
Western nations also refused to confront Turkey over its repression of
the Kurds, due to Turkey's importance as a NATO ally and secular
balance to extremist Muslim factions in the region.1 ' In the recent
Gulf War, the United States used the Kurds to destabilize Iraq in
order to secure the oil and freedom of Kuwait, but left the Kurds to
fend for themselves after Kuwait was liberated.' The U.S. position
of supporting the unity of Iraq for self-serving political reasons is on
record.
We support the unity of Iraq. But there's a very practical reason -
not that we think Saddam Hussein should repress the Kurds and
the Shiites .... But there is a political balance of power in the
region among states that historically have been at least not friends,
or they've been antagonistic .... If you change the balance signifi-
cantly, you could induce enormous instabilities."
This political manipulation of the Kurds has been the rule, not the
214. See PELETIRE, supra note 148, at 23-29.
215. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 158. "The United States, Iran and Turkey have
always used Iraqi Kurds to harass Iraq's central government, but they have never
desired the creation of an independent Kurdish state that would bring about insta-
bility in Turkey and Iran." Masoud Kazemzadeh, How George Bush Lost Iraq, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1992, at 3B.
216. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 158-59. See David Hirst, Kurdish Pawns Struggle
to Break Regional Stalemate, Nov. 7, 1992, GUARDIAN, at 10.
217. GERARD CHALIAND, Introduction to A.R. GHASSEMLOU ET AL., PEOPLE WITH-
OUT A CoUNTRY: THE KURDs AND KURDIsTAN 8-17 (Gerard Chaliand ed. & Michael
Pallis trans., 1980).
218. David Hirst, Kurdish Pawns Struggle to Break Regional Stalemate, GuARD-
IAN, Nov. 7, 1992, at 10.
219. Kurdish State; Turn up the Volume to Turkey, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 12,
1992, at A12.
220. See generally Betraying the Kurds, supra note 155.
221. Doyle McManus, Nations Splitting Up? U.S. Prefers Stability of Current Bor-
ders, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1991, at A10 (quoting Brent Scowcroft, National Security
Advisor to President Bush).
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exception, throughout history. Outside powers have been more con-
cerned with keeping Iraqi leaders off balance than providing the Kurds
with humanitarian assistance.=
The plight of the Kurds, especially after the Gulf War, demon-
strates the indifference the international community has shown to-
wards the principle of self-determination when it seemingly conflicts
with self-serving political considerations.' Once the United States
decided that weakening Iraq was in its own interest, a double standard
was created regarding the Kurds: "Those in Iraq are the pitiable, per-
secuted victims of arch-villain Saddam Hussein, whereas Turkish
Kurds are deemed troublemakers and terrorists who need to be con-
trolled.' 2 Realpolitik, rather than justice, governs self-determination
for violently oppressed groups in the 'new world order' just as it did in
the old world order.'
Any unilateral effort by Turkey or Iraq to improve the situation of
their respective Kurdish populations also must be viewed with skepti-
cism. Not only have both countries violated past agreements with the
Kurds,' but each country has reasons to at least appear accommo-
dating. Turkey must correct its human rights record before being al-
lowed to join the European Union (E.U.).227 Iraq must improve its im-
age in the international community if it expects to secure any economic
or political allies.
Following the Gulf War, the United Nations again looked on help-
lessly as states alternately intervened and ignored the Kurds as their
own self-interests dictated. Without the U.N. willing to take the lead,
states were also free to ignore the atrocities, creating an international
'conspiracy of silence.' The other possibility was that states would
intervene and promote their own self-interests under the guise of hu-
manitarian intervention.2 The intervention of the United States and
other Western nations on behalf of the Kurds after the Gulf War was
certainly necessary, but it was nonetheless disconcerting for the inter-
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national community. "The presence of the coalition forces on Iraqi
territory due to the revolts of the Kurdish people is unjustifiable. The
coalition should hand over policy regarding the Kurdish people to the
UN, which has no territorial ambition.'m The U.N. is the only insti-
tution capable of intervening on behalf of an oppressed people, without
the appearance of acting out of political self-interest.
After initial inaction, however, the U.N. Security Council took a
significant step by passing Resolution 688, which expressly condemns
Iraq's severe repressive of the Kurds. 1 Although the U.N. Charter
prohibits interference in matters essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of a member state, a situation threatening international peace
and security authorizes the Security Council to act. 2 The U.N. Sec-
retary General also may take any matter to the Security Council that
threatens the maintenance of international peace and security.' The
United Nations has recognized that state sponsored genocide, the use
of chemical weapons, the mass migration of displaced refugees, and
violations of human rights constitute a threat to international peace;
and more importantly, the U.N. finally has acted.
The Kurds in Iraq demonstrate that they are capable of function-
ing as an independent state, even under harsh circumstances. Given
the degree of oppression and discrimination against the Kurds in Tur-
key, Iran, and Iraq, the international community should at least sup-
port the Kurds efforts to obtain an autonomous state in each of these
countries. Of course, the decision should be left to the Kurds as to
whether they want a fully independent Kurdistan. But if the Kurds do
opt for secession, the international community, under the leadership of
the U.N., should evaluate their claim by applying criteria, such as
those suggested above, and should not allow countries to manipulate
the Kurds in order to further their own objectives. The time has come
for the international community to recognize secession as a legitimate
possibility under self-determination and to stabilize international rela-
tions through active U.N. involvement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Self-determination has become customary international law, thus
applicable to all nations. It also has emerged as an overriding principle
when in conflict with other principles of international law. Self-deter-
mination has not, however, obtained the status ofjus cogens, primarily
because it applies only to groups, not universally.
230. Intervention and Responsibility, supra note 192, at 19 (excerpt and quote
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Only an impartial institution representing the entire international
community can regulate claims of self-determination and secession.
Any type of state involvement, other than perhaps formal recognition,
risks appearing as a cloak for implementing a political agenda. States
will continue to act in their own self-interest, not to protect human
rights. Rather than allowing states to unilaterally determine the valid-
ity of claims of self-determination and secession, standards and criteria
must be formulated and consistently applied by the United Nations.
In order to claim a right to self-determination there must be (1)
an identifiable group, determined by applying objective, subjective, and
territorial standards; and (2) a substantial grievance in the form of
subjugation, a violation of fundamental human rights, or territorial
deprivation. Although defining group identity and what constitutes a
substantial grievance are subject to interpretation, so are many other
accepted legal standards (i.e. reasonableness).
After establishing a right to self-determination, additional criteria
must be satisfied before a legitimate right to secede exists. These crite-
ria require that (1) less extreme remedies be exhausted; (2) the leaders
of the group represent the majority and account for opposing views; (3)
the group demonstrate some level of political and economic viability;
(4) a valid territorial claim exist if the group is seceding from an exist-
ing state, but not in a colonial context or if the seceding group joins an
existing nation; (5) the use of force be necessary and proportionate;
and (6) the overall benefits of allowing secession outweigh the burdens.
The ultimate goal is to maximize world harmony by striking a balance
between individual human rights and state rights. The threshold ques-
tion becomes whether the benefit to the seceding group and interna-
tional community outweighs the burden to the dominant state and
international community. If the answer is yes, the secessionist claim is
legitimate.
In applying these standards and criteria to the Kurds, it is appar-
ent that they have satisfied the requirements for claiming a right to
self-determination and have an extremely strong claim for secession.
The Kurds are an identifiable people with a distinct culture and lan-
guage who have lived in the same territorial region for thousands of
years. They have suffered such atrocities as state sponsored genocide,
cultural extermination, and gross violations of fundamental human
rights. To say that the Kurds have a substantial grievance is a ridicu-
lous understatement.
The Kurds are still attempting to achieve their goal of freedom
through methods short of secession. Their leaders are willing to poll
the opinion of the group before acting and advocate remedies short of
outright secession. Although there is some factionalism amongst the
Kurdish leadership, this is a healthy foundation for a politically viable
democracy. The Kurds are also capable of economic viability, especially
if they obtain their legitimate territorial claim that includes rich oil-
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producing regions. The Kurds do not need a territorial claim in order
to achieve autonomy, except as an aid in defining the borders. Regard-
less, the Kurds do have a legitimate claim to the territory they have
inhabited for centuries. International agreements, including the Treaty
of Sevres, have recognized the Kurds' territorial claim. The Kurds use
of force has been both necessary and proportionate. In addition to
potential factionalism, the use of terrorist tactics by the Kurds is a
weakness in their claim. However, it is remarkable that a people faced
with genocidal extermination has not resorted to all-out warfare or
unrestricted terrorism in order to preserve their race. Finally, the
disruptiveness of allowing a people to be exterminated, oppressed, and
forced out of their own territory outweighs the disruptiveness of allow-
ing them an autonomous or independent state. The benefit of allowing
millions of people to live without the constant fear of complete annihi-
lation surely outweighs the burden to Iraq and Turkey of losing people
and territory that they treat with total disregard.
Individuals create states in order to protect their fundamental
rights, therefore it makes sense to continue promoting human rights
over state rights when they are incompatible. Rather than viewing
secessionist struggles as a dangerous step towards anarchy, they
should be viewed as a natural process of allowing groups of individuals
who were forced into political units against their will to freely exercise
their right of self-determination. It is probably more than coincidental
that as secessionist claims increase, creating smaller nation-states, so
does the number of large international organizations like the European
Union. Perhaps these two seemingly incompatible trends are actually a
preview of the future world order, where regional multinational organi-
zations interact in a true international community. To prohibit all
secessionist claims would be to stifle the positive development of hu-
man rights and the continual evolution of a viable world order.
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